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For a number of governments around the world C Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Egypt C linking attacks on their soil to al-Qaida became a way to shift attention away from their own brutality, corruption and incompetence, and to gain diplomatic or material benefits from Washington.
对于乌兹别克斯坦、巴基斯坦、埃及等国政府来说，把在其领土上发生的袭击与基地组织联系起来，成为一种转移注意力的方式，使其不再关注自己的暴行、腐败和无能，并从华盛顿获得外交或物质利益。
For some officials in Washington, linking terrorist attacks to state-sponsored groups became a convenient way to justify policies, such as the continuing isolation of Iran, or military interventions such as the invasion of Iraq.
对华盛顿的一些官员来说，将恐怖袭击与国家支持的团体联系起来，成为证明政策合理性的一种便捷方式，如继续孤立伊朗，或进行军事干预，如入侵伊拉克。
For many analysts and policymakers, who were heavily influenced by the conventional wisdom on terrorism inherited from the cold war, thinking in terms of hierarchical groups and state sponsors was comfortably familiar.
对于许多深受冷战时期遗留下来的恐怖主义传统智慧影响的分析家和政策制定者来说，他们很熟悉等级集团和国家赞助者的思维方式。
A final factor was more subtle.
最后一个因素则更为微妙。
Attributing the new wave of violence to a single group not only obscured the deep, complex and troubling roots of Islamic militancy but also suggested the threat it posed would end when al-Qaida was finally eliminated.
将新的暴力事件归咎于一个团体，不仅掩盖了伊斯兰激进主义的深刻、复杂和令人不安的根源，而且还暗示只有当基地组织最终被消灭时，它所构成的威胁才会结束。
This was reassuring, both for decision-makers and the public.
这对决策者和公众来说都是一种安慰。
By the middle of the decade, it was clear that this analysis was inadequate.
到了十年中期，这种分析显然是不充分的。
Bombs in Bali, Istanbul and Mombasa were the work of centrally organised attackers, but the 2004 attack on trains in Madrid had been executed by a small network only tenuously connected to the al-Qaida senior leadership 4,000 miles away.
巴厘岛、伊斯坦布尔和蒙巴萨的炸弹袭击都是集中组织的袭击者所为，但2004年对马德里火车的袭击是由一个小型网络执行的，该网络与4000英里外的基地组织高级领导层只有微弱的联系。
For every operation like the 2005 bombings in London C which was close to the model established by the 9/11 attacks C there were more attacks that didnt seem to have any direct link to Bin Laden, even if they might have been inspired by his ideology.
每一次像2005年伦敦爆炸案这样的行动，都接近于9/11袭击所建立的模式，而更多的袭击似乎与本-拉登没有任何直接联系，即使它们可能受到他的意识形态的启发。
There was growing evidence that the threat from Islamic militancy was evolving into something different, something closer to the leaderless resistance promoted by white supremacists two decades earlier.
越来越多的证据表明，来自伊斯兰激进主义的威胁正在演变为不同的东西，更接近于20年前白人至上主义者所倡导的无领导抵抗。
As the 2000s drew to a close, attacks perpetrated by people who seemed to be acting alone began to outnumber all others.
随着2000年代接近尾声，由似乎是单独行动的人实施的袭击开始超过所有其他袭击。
These events were less deadly than the spectacular strikes of a few years earlier, but the trend was alarming.
这些事件没有几年前的壮观罢工那么致命，但这种趋势令人担忧。
In the UK in 2008, a convert to Islam with mental health problems attempted to blow up a restaurant in Exeter, though he injured no one but himself.
2008年在英国，一名有精神问题的伊斯兰教皈依者试图炸毁埃克塞特的一家餐馆，但他只伤到了自己。
In 2009, a US army major shot 13 dead in Fort Hood, Texas.
2009年，一名美国陆军少校在德克萨斯州胡德堡开枪打死13人。
In 2010, a female student stabbed an MP in London.
2010年，一名女学生在伦敦刺伤了一名议员。
None appeared, initially, to have any broader connections to the global jihadi movement.
最初，没有人与全球圣战运动有任何更广泛的联系。
