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Effectively the international (financial) system has a tow-tier structure：Countries that can borrow in their own currency constitute the center, and those, whose borrowings are denominated in one of the hard currencies, constitute the periphery. If individual countries get into difficulties they receive assistance but only on strict conditions. That holds true whether they are from the center or from the periphery. But if tie center itself becomes endangered, then, preserving the system take precedence over all other considerations.
事实上国际金融体系拥有双层结构：能用本国货币进行借贷的国家构成了该体系的中心，而只能通过硬通货进行借贷的国家则构成了这个体系的外围。如果有成员国陷入困境，不论它们是处于该体系的中心或外沿，它们均可得到援助，但条件很苛刻。但是如果中心本身遇到了威胁，那么金融体系的维护就成了优先考虑的问题。
That happened for the first time in the international banking crisis of 1982. If the debtor countries had been allowed to default, the banking system would have collapsed. Therefore the international financial authorities banded together and introduced what I called at the time "the collective system of lending". The lenders were induced to roll over their loans and the debtor countries were lent enough additional money to service their debts. The net effect was that debtor countries fell into severe recession —Latin America lost a decade of growth —but the banking system was allowed to earn its way out of a hole. When the banks built up sufficient reserves the loans were restructured into so-called Brady bonds and the banks wrote off their remaining losses.
这一点在1982年的国际金融危机中第一次得到验证。当时如果允许债务国拖欠还款，银行系统就会崩溃。于是，国际金融权威机构联合起来，并采取了当时被我称作“集体出借体制”的方法，即借贷国将贷款延期，借给债务国足够的额外资金偿还债务。实际的结果是，债务国陷入严重的经济衰退期——拉丁美洲的经济增长被阻滞了 10年——而银行系统得以贏利而侥幸摆脱困境。当各银行积累了足够的储备，债款就被重组为所谓的“布雷迪债券"，其余的损失均由银行自负。
