The Turing ideas of discrete state machines and universality were required to lend precision and substance to the cybernetic claim.
控制论要想发展得更加精确、经得起推敲,还应该引入图灵的关于离散状态机和通用性的思想。
Some of Wiener's assertions were rather easy to attack; but Jefferson did go further than just knocking them down, playing some strong commonsense cards, such as: But neither animals nor men can be explained by studying nervous mechanics in isolation, so complicated are they by endocrines, so coloured is thought by emotion.
要想驳倒维纳的某些观点是很容易的,但是杰弗逊并没有止步于此,他还说:无论是动物还是人类,都不能用孤立的神经机制来解释,他们还有着复杂的内分泌,以及多姿多彩的情绪。
Sex hormones introduce peculiarities of behaviour often as inexplicable as they are impressive (as in migratory fish).
性激素能引起最让人难忘的行为,有些鱼类具有迁徒的习性,这些都不能只通过神经来解释。
Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain—that is, not only write it but know that it had written it.
除非有一天,机器能够有感而发,写出十四行诗,或者谱出协奏曲,而不只是符号的组合,我们才能认可,机器等同于大脑——不光要写出这些,而且还要感受它们。
No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or miserable when it cannot get what it wants.
任何机器都无法对成功感到喜悦,对电子管故障感到悲伤,对赞美感到温暖,对错误感到沮丧,对性感感到着迷,对失去心爱之物感到痛苦。
Jefferson ended by 'ranging myself with the humanist Shakespeare rather than the mechanists, recalling Hamlet's lines: “What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty”', and so forth.
杰弗逊以"我愿做莎士比亚的同胞,而不是冰冷的机器,我想起了哈姆雷特的话:人类是多么了不起的杰作啊!多么高贵的理性!多么伟大的力量!"等等作为结束。
Shakespeare was often exhibited in these discussions as proof of the speaker's exquisite human sensibilities.
在这一类讲话中,莎士比亚经常会被引用为人类感性的典型。
However, Jefferson had done a good deal to improve upon the 'piece of work' himself, not only by mending the broken heads of two world wars but as an exponent in the late 1930s of the frontal lobotomy.
杰弗逊确实为"了不起的杰作"做了很多正经事,他不但治疗了许多被两次世界大战敲碎的脑袋,还在30年代发明了额叶切除手术。
This was the 'heads in the sand' argument, resting upon the assumption that a machine, because its components were non-biological, was incapable of creative thinking.
这是一种鸵鸟式的观点,它基于这样一个假设:机器的配件是非生物性的,所以它不可能具有创造性的思维。
'When we hear it said that wireless valves think,' Jefferson said, 'we may despair of language.'
杰弗逊说:"要说电子管有思维,简直荒谬到让人绝望。"
But no cybernetician had said the valves thought, no more than anyone would say that the nerve-cells thought. Here lay the confusion.
但实际上,没人说电子管有思维,正如没人说神经细胞有思维,单独讨论一个配件是否有思维,这是没有意义的。
It was the system as a whole that 'thought', in Alan's view, and it was its logical structure, not its particular physical embodiment, that made this possible.
在图灵看来,"思维"是一个整体系统,这个系统是一种逻辑结构,并不依赖于承载它的特定物理实体。