When the Saudis, the leaders of Opec, decided at the cartel’s recent meeting in Vienna to maintain their oil production levels, it sent a strong message to the world: the market, not Opec, should decide oil prices. As a result oil prices dropped, falling below $60 per barrel this week.
当石油输出国组织(OPEC,简称:欧佩克)领军者沙特在最近的维也纳会议上决定维持产量不变时,它向世界传递出了一个明确的信息:决定油价的应该是市场、而非欧佩克。结果是油价下跌,本周更是降至每桶60美元以下。
This is a big change for the world’s largest oil exporter, which has in the past attempted to manage the global oil markets by altering production levels. The kingdom in essence decided to pursue a policy that not only preserves its market share in the long term but also heralds the coming end of Opec as a united organisation that still has a collective say in export decisions. While the decision was unpopular with most oil-exporting countries and large international energy companies, there are several reasons for Saudi Arabia to take this approach.
对这个全球最大的石油出口国来说,这是一个重大的改变——沙特过去曾试图通过调整产量水平来管理全球石油市场。本质上,沙特决定实施的政策不仅会在长期内保住其市场份额,还预示着欧佩克这个组织将变得不那么团结,虽然它的石油出口决定仍是由成员国集体做出的。尽管该决定不受大多数石油出口国和大型国际能源公司的欢迎,但沙特有多个理由这么做。
First, the Saudi leadership has long recognised the strategic importance of spare production capacity, so it has spent at least $10bn in the past decade to maintain 2m barrels per day of capacity that can be called upon at short notice. No other country has had the political will and foresight to do this, and it provides the Saudis with the means to go it alone against the will of the majority of oil producers, led by Russia, Iran and Venezuela.
首先,沙特领导人早就认识到空闲产能的战略意义,因此该国在过去十年花费了至少100亿美元来维持随时可调用的200万桶/日的产能。其他所有国家缺乏这么做的政治意愿和远见,这让沙特有能力独力对抗以俄罗斯、伊朗和委内瑞拉为首的大多数产油国的意愿。
This decision will have big political and economic effects on some of the kingdom’s fiercest adversaries. In short, significantly lower prices over the medium to long term will directly neutralise what Saudi Arabia perceives as the destructive geopolitical actions of these countries in the Middle East.
该决定将对沙特的一些最凶狠的敌手产生巨大的政治经济影响。简言之,油价在中长期内大幅下跌,将直接瓦解沙特眼中这些国家在中东地区展开的破坏性地缘政治行动。
From an internal Saudi perspective, lower oil prices are entirely manageable. Saudi oil is relatively cheap to extract so crude production can remain highly profitable at lower prices. In fact, with new drilling technologies, Saudi production costs have decreased even further, while field reservoir management, a technique to prolong the life cycle of a producing field by better managing its proven reserves, has become more efficient.
从沙特国内角度看,油价下跌完全是可控的。沙特石油开采成本相对较低,因此即便油价下跌,原油生产依然利润很高。实际上,随着新钻探技术的采用,沙特的生产成本甚至进一步下降,同时油藏管理变得更加高效。油藏管理是一种通过更好地管理已探明储量来延长开采油田生命周期的技术。
Second, the Saudis have about $900bn in foreign assets, so their public finances are immune to a sudden big fall in revenues from petroleum sales. Finally, it seems clear that the Saudis want to bring back the realism of raw power to the global energy markets, which means the long-term national security interests of the kingdom — the top Opec producer and exporter — come first.
其次,沙特拥有大约9000亿美元外国资产,因此石油销售收入突然大幅下降不会对他们的公共财政产生冲击。最后,似乎很明显的是,沙特希望让全球能源市场的原始力量重新发挥作用,这意味着首先要考虑沙特的长期国家安全利益。沙特是欧佩克最大的石油生产国和出口国。
The Saudis also clearly view lower prices as helping them keep market share in the face of the shale oil production boom in the US. This revolutionary innovation will add several million barrels of oil per day to the global market. However, shale oil is expensive to extract, so lower prices will mean several important US producers will find their business models unsustainable over the mid to long term. Of course, the Saudi objective is to mitigate the increase in shale oil, not eradicate it, in order to assure a soft landing for global markets when oil prices rebound.
沙特显然还认为,油价下跌有利于他们在美国页岩油产量大幅增长之际保住市场份额。页岩油这种革命性的创新会让全球市场石油日供应量增加数百万桶。然而,页岩油开采成本高,因此油价下跌将意味着,美国数家重要的页岩油生产商会发现它们的业务模式在中长期内不可持续。当然,沙特的目标是减慢页岩油产量的增长、而非彻底摧毁它,以确保在油价反弹时全球市场能够软着陆。
Saudi Arabia holds about 25 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, 85 per cent of spare production capacity, and is the largest crude exporter by far. Hence, it has always taken a long-term moderate approach to implementing energy policy, in stark contrast to the other Opec countries (save its Gulf allies).
沙特拥有全球大约25%的石油储量和85%的空闲产能,而且原油出口量遥遥领先于其他任何国家。因此,沙特在执行能源政策时始终秉持一种长期温和路线,这与其他欧佩克成员国形成鲜明对比(沙特的海湾地区盟友除外)。
Through various revenue model projections based on different oil price averages and export levels, the Saudis can sustain oil prices at $60 per barrel on average for at least five years, with dips as low as $40 per barrel. It would be a mistake to doubt the political resolve of the kingdom to see this new policy through in this new oil era. Inevitably the Saudi decision shows that Opec is increasingly irrelevant as a force in the global oil market. Further, the Opec and non-Opec members that have no room to increase exports and lack the political will and financial means to cut production — Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Russia, Mexico and Nigeria — will become mere passive spectators.
通过基于不同均价和出口水平的多个收入模式预测,即使平均油价在长达5年的时间里维持在每桶60美元的水平、甚至其间油价偶尔跌至每桶40美元,沙特也能承受。如果你认为沙特没有政治决心在这个新的石油时代贯彻这一新政策,那就错了。沙特的决定无疑表明,欧佩克在全球石油市场上的角色日益无足轻重。此外,没有余地增加出口以及缺乏政治意愿和财政缓冲实施减产的欧佩克成员国及非欧佩克国家——伊朗、伊拉克、委内瑞拉、俄罗斯、墨西哥和尼日利亚——将成为纯粹被动的旁观者。
Saudi Arabia, in keeping up with the changing realities in the energy markets, has realised that the market will rule. Oil producers that have not understood this tectonic shift and begun to adapt to this new reality will suffer, and be left behind to face their day of reckoning.
紧跟能源市场变化步伐的沙特已经认识到,未来将是市场说了算。没明白这种结构性转变并开始适应这种新现实的产油国将陷入困境,会掉队并面临市场的清算。
Nawaf Obaid is a visiting fellow and associate instructor at the Belfer Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government
本文作者是哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院(Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government)贝尔弗尔中心(Belfer Center)客座研究员兼副讲师