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Monetary policy
货币政策
Tight, loose, irrelevant
或紧或松没有关系
Interest rates do not seem to affect investment as economists assume
利率似乎并不像经济学家假设的那样影响投资
IT IS Economics 101. If central bankers want to spur economic activity, they cut interest rates. If they want to dampen it, they raise them. The assumption is that, as it becomes cheaper or more expensive for businesses and households to borrow, they will adjust their spending accordingly. But for businesses in America, at least, a newstudy* suggests that the accepted wisdom on monetary policy is broadly (but not entirely) wrong.
上过经济学101课程的人都知道：如果中央银行想刺激经济，那么它会降低利率；而如果它想遏制经济过度膨胀，就会提高利率。我们这样说的前提假设是：当企业家或家庭贷款的成本增加或降低时，他们会相应地调整支出。但是一项最新的调查显示，对于企业家们，至少是美国的企业家，这个公认的货币政策原理在经常是错误的（但不完全错误）。
Using data stretching back to 1952, the paper concludes that market interest rates, which central banks aim to influence when they set their policy rates, play some role in how much firms invest, but not much. Other factors—most notably how profitable a firm is and how well its shares do—are far more important (see chart). A government that wants to pep up the economy, says S.P. Kothari of the Sloan School of Management, one of the authors, would have more luck with other measures, such as lower taxes or less onerous regulation.
使用1952年以来的数据，这篇论文得出这样一个结论：央行希望通过制定利率政策来控制市场利率，这个市场利率对企业投资具有一定影响作用，但作用并不大。而其他因素，尤其是企业获利能力和股票收益情况，则更加显著地影响投资。其中一名来自斯隆管理学院的作者S.P. Kothari说道：如果政府希望刺激经济，应该多采取除货币政策以外的其他措施，比如降低企业税收、减少企业法律义务。
Establishing what drives business investment is difficult, not least because it expands and contracts far more dramatically than the economy as a whole. These shifts were particularly manic in the late 1950s (both up and down), mid-1960s (up), and 2000s (down, up, then down again). Overall, investment has been in slight decline since the early 1980s.
建立一种刺激企业投资的机制是很困难的，不仅仅是因为它扩张和相互联系的方式远远比经济整体更加复杂。这种波动在这些时段表现得尤为显著：20世纪50年代末（有上涨也有下跌）、60年代中叶（上涨）、2000年代（先涨后跌，然后又涨）。总体来说，从20世纪80年代早期开始，投资增速就开始慢慢减缓了。
Having sifted through decades of data, however, the authors conclude that neither volatility in the financial markets nor credit-default swaps, a measure of corporate credit risk that tends to influence the rates firms pay, has much impact. In fact, investment often rises when interest rates go up and volatility increases.
然而，通过仔细研究几十年的数据，这篇论文的作者得出这样一个结论：无论是金融市场波动率还是信用违约掉期费率（一个衡量企业信贷风险的指标，通常会影响企业投资所支付的利率），对企业投资都无显著冲击。实际上，当利率提高、市场波动增强时，企业投资通常会增加。
Investment grows most quickly, though, in response to a surge in profits and drops with bad news. These ups and downs suggest shifts in investment go too far and are often ill-timed. At any rate, they do little good: big cuts can substantially boost profits, but only briefly; big increases in investment slightly decrease profits.
虽然投资随着繁荣而快速增加，随着经济下滑而快速减少；但是这种波动却表明，投资的变动波幅太大，并且通常是滞后的。不管利率是高是低，投资的变动对经济刺激作用都很小：大幅增加投资确实可以持续促进盈利，但这个作用很小；而大幅减少投资也只能轻微地降低利润。
Companies, Mr Kothari says, tend to dwell too much on recent experience when deciding how much to invest and too little on how changing circumstances may affect future returns. This is particularly true in difficult times. Appealing opportunities may exist, and they may be all the more attractive because of low interest rates. That should matter—but the data suggest it does not.
Kothari先生说，企业在决定投资多少时，往往过多地关注于近期的经验，而很少关注利率变动对未来收益会有何影响。在低谷的时候这种现象更加严重。赚大钱的机会是存在的，并且当利率很低时，投资会变得更具吸引力。利率应当是影响投资的--但数据表明事实并非如此。译者：柯维
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