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Business
商业报道
HP's grand vision
惠普的远大宏景
Aping IBM
效仿IBM
HP needs to transform itself if it is to avoid becoming obsolete
若想避免被淘汰，惠普需要自我更新
WHEN the board of HP, the world's largest computer-maker, unveiled plans to restructure, it expected the company's shares to suffer; but not to crash by 20%.
当全球最大的计算机制造商—惠普—的董事会公开了其改组计划之后，它预计公司的股份会下跌，但没想到会下跌20%。
HP's bosses thought investors would love their plan to spin off the firm's low-margin personal-computer business, but be wary of their plan to buy Autonomy, a British software-maker, for a handsome $10.3 billion.
惠普的股东们以为这个让惠普低毛利的个人电脑得以大赚一笔的计划会受到投资人的喜爱；而103亿美元高额收购Autonomy的计划则会使投资人踌躇不前。
In fact, they hated both ideas. On August 19th, the day after the announcement, they wiped $12 billion off HP's market value.
事实上，投资人对这两个计划都没兴趣。惠普对外宣称其计划的第二天，8月19日，惠普的市值下降了120亿美元。
One problem was that the announcement left unclear what HP wanted to do with its PC unit and why exactly it intends to pay so much for Autonomy. Another factor was that many of the firm's shareholders are short-termists, who were scared away by lowered revenue and profit forecasts.
一方面，这此宣告并没有明确讲明惠普对其个人电脑有何打算，也没有说明它为什么要以如此高额来收购Autonomy；另一方面，惠普的很多股东都是短期投资人，他们被低收入以及低利率前景吓到了。
But the big problem is that Léo Apotheker, HP's newish boss, is taking a huge gamble.
但最大的问题在于惠普的新老板Léo Apotheker这次玩大的：
He is trying to follow the example of IBM, by reducing HP's dependence on hardware and pushing up into software and services.
他打算效仿IBM，减少惠普对硬件的依赖，而转向软件和服务业务。
To grasp what HP has in mind, one has to understand the two main currents in the IT industry.
要弄清楚惠普脑袋里装的是什么，就要先知晓目前IT行业的两股主要潮流：
First, nearly any new technology quickly becomes a commodity that is easily copied and hence not very profitable.
第一，几乎所有的新技术都会一夜之间成为简单复制的商品，因此利润也有限。
This is why IT firms are always trying to move up the stack into software and services, where margins are higher.
这就是为什么IT公司总是想办法进军跻身利润更加丰厚的软件业和服务业。
Second, the biggest IT firms typically control what is known as a platform: a digital foundation on which others build their products, such as Microsoft's Windows.
第二，典型的大型IT企业会操控一个平台：一个他人会在上面创建电子产品的基础，如同微软的Windows。
This allows them to capture a disproportionate share of the industry's profits.
这使得它们得以获得份额不一地利润。
HP seems to have ignored both currents, at least in the past decade. Carly Fiorina, its boss from 1999 to 2005, merged with Compaq, another computer-maker, in a deal worth $25 billion.
至少过去十年来，惠普似乎对两股潮流都视而不见。惠普1999年至2005年的总裁Carly Fiorina以250亿美元并购了另一家电脑制造商Compad。
Mark Hurd, her successor, cut costs but was ousted in 2010 after a dust-up over sex and expenses before he could fix the firm's strategy.
Carly Fiorina的后继人Mark Hurd降低了支出，但2010年，他还没完成惠普的战略计划之时，他就因陷入财政和性爱双重丑闻而被扫出局。
That job now falls to Mr Apotheker.
如今重任落在了Mr Apotheker肩上。
The firm's PC business is the world's biggest, but is not as profitable as HP's other units.
惠普的个人电脑业务规模居全球之首，但利润还是比不上惠普的其它业务。
What is more, most buyers of HP's machines are consumers, whose demands shift faster and more whimsically than those of corporate customers.
此外，惠普的大多数客户是消费者，相比那些企业客户，他们的口味变化既快又古怪。
So HP intends to turn its PC business into a separate unit and then spin it off.
因此，惠普想要将其个人电脑业务独立出来，并争取扩大利润。
Buying Autonomy also helps HP to move onto higher-margin terrain: the British firm's operating margins exceed 40%.
收购Autonomy也帮惠普进军更大利润的领域：这个英国公司的盈利空间超过40%。
But the main reason HP paid a 64% premium for its shares seems to be that it believes that Autonomy's technology could be turned into a platform to help companies make sense of their ever-growing pile of data.
但是惠普愿意购买64%的股份似乎是因为它相信Autonomy的技术可以转变为一个平台，这个平台有助于企业处理其日益增长的数据。
This includes not only structured data, but also the unstructured kind, which now makes up more than 80% of the information that flows through a typical company.
不仅包括结构化数据，还包括那些如今构成一个典型企业80%信息量的非结构化数据。
Such a platform would allow firms to do some nifty things.
这样一个平台使得企业做事更有效率。
A retailer, for instance, might decide how much beer to stock based not just on previous sales records, but also on weather forecasts, party chatter on social media and schedules for sports matches.
比如，一个零售商不仅可以之前的销售记录为依据，还可以天气预报、媒体上的党派言论以及体育项目的记事日程来决定啤酒的囤货量。
All this sounds sensible.
这一切听起来似乎都很明智。
But establishing a new platform and ultimately becoming a firm that looks much like IBM is a tall order.
但建立一个新的平台并最终成就一个类似IBM的企业并非易事。
Many other firms are also jostling to become the main interpreter of corporate data.
很多企业也在处理企业数据领域相争得你死我活。
To reach its goal of having software generate 8-9% of its revenues by 2015, up from less than 3% today, HP will probably have to make further acquisitions.
惠普的计划是在2015年之前使得软件盈利占其收入的8-9%，而今天软件为惠普带来的收入只占了3%，要完成这一目标，惠普可能要再并购其他企业。
And its services business is mainly about keeping IT systems running, not about helping firms reinvent themselves.
而惠普的服务业主要着眼于保持IT系统正常运转，而不是重构企业本身。
Given the difficulties, it is not surprising that many shareholders have bolted.
考虑到这些困难，那么大多数股东打退堂鼓也就不足为奇了。
But HP and its new boss should not be faulted for trying.
但不应该谴责惠普及其新老总的尝试。
They have little alternative, if they wish to avoid becoming a collection of commodity businesses.
如果他们想要避免沦落为一个商品企业，那么他们就别无他选。
Technology is a brutal business, says Mr Apotheker. If you don't innovate and reinvent yourself, you will become obsolete.
技术行业是很残忍的， Apotheker说道，如果你不自我创新，那迟早会被淘汰。
