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The sense of there being a thinking thing behind AI chatbots is also driven by the now common wisdom that we don't know exactly how AI systems work.
人工智能聊天机器人背后存在思维的感觉，也是由于我们并不确切知道人工智能系统如何工作所驱动的，这是现在常见的观点。
What's called the black box problem is often framed in mystical terms – the robots are so far ahead or so alien that they are doing something we can't comprehend.
所谓的黑箱问题常常被神秘化——机器人遥遥领先或如此陌生，以至于它们正在做一些我们无法理解的事情。
That is true, but not quite in the way it sounds.
这是真的，但不完全是听起来的那样。
New York University professor Leif Weatherby suggests that the models are processing so many permutations of data that it is impossible for a single person to wrap their head around it.
纽约大学教授雷夫·韦瑟比表示，这些模型正在处理如此多的数据排列组合，以至于一个人不可能完全理解。
The mysticism of AI isn't a hidden or inscrutable mind behind the curtain; it's to do with scale and brute power.
人工智能的神秘性不在于幕后隐藏或难以理解的思维；而是与规模和强大的力量有关。
Yet, even in that distinction – that AI is able to do language only through computing power – there is still an interesting question of what it means to think.
然而，即使在这种区别中——人工智能只能通过计算能力来处理语言——仍然存在一个有趣的问题，即思考意味着什么。
York University professor Kristin Andrews, who researches animal intelligence, suggests that there are lots of cognitive tasks – remembering how to get food, recognising objects or other beings – that animals do without necessarily being self-aware.
约克大学研究动物智力的教授克里斯汀·安德鲁斯认为，动物在没有自我意识的情况下也能完成许多认知任务，例如记住如何获取食物、识别物体或其他生物。
In that sense, intelligence may well be attributed to AI because it can do what we would usually refer to as cognition.
从这个意义上说，智能很可能被归因于人工智能，因为它可以做我们通常所说的认知。
But, as Andrews notes, there's nothing to suggest that AI has an identity or a will or desires.
但是，正如安德鲁斯所指出的，没有任何迹象表明人工智能具有身份、意志或欲望。
So much of what produces will and desire is located in the body, not just in the obvious sense of erotic desire but the more complex relation between an interior subjectivity, our unconscious, and how we move as a body through the world, processing information and reacting to it.
如此多的意志和欲望产生于身体之中，这不仅体现在明显的性欲上，还体现在内在主观性、我们的潜意识以及我们作为身体在世界中移动、处理信息和对其做出反应的更复杂关系上。
Zebrowski suggests there is a case to be made that “the body matters for how we can think and why we think and what we think about”.
泽布罗夫斯基认为，有理由认为“身体对于我们如何思考、为什么思考以及思考什么都很重要”。
She adds, “It's not like you can just take a computer program and stick it in the head of a robot and have an embodied thing.”
她补充说：“这可不像你能把一个计算机程序塞进机器人的脑袋里，然后就有了一个具身的东西。”
Computers might in fact approach what we call thinking, but they don't dream, or want, or desire, and this matters more than AI's boosters let on.
计算机实际上可能会接近我们所说的思考，但它们不会做梦、不会想要、也不会渴望，这一点比人工智能的支持者所承认的更为重要。
When we use our intelligence to craft solutions to economic crises or to tackle racism, we do so out of a sense of morality, of obligation to those around us – our cultivated sense that we have a responsibility to make things better in specific, morally significant ways.
当我们运用智慧来制定经济危机的解决方案或应对种族主义时，我们这样做是出于一种道德感，出于对我们周围人的义务感——我们培养出的一种责任感，即我们有责任以具体的、具有道德意义的方式让事情变得更好。
Perhaps the model of the computer in Clarke's story – something that is kind of a shortcut to transcendence or omniscience – is thus the wrong one.
或许克拉克故事中的计算机模型——某种通往超越或全知的捷径——是错误的。
Instead, Deep Thought, the computer in Douglas Adams's The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, might be closer.
相反，道格拉斯·亚当斯的《银河系漫游指南》中的计算机深思可能更接近。
When asked “the answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe and Everything”, it of course spits out that famously obtuse answer: “42”.
当被问及“生命、宇宙以及任何事情的终极答案”时，它当然会吐出那个著名的、晦涩的答案：“42”。
The absurdity of the answer points to an easily forgotten truth.
这个答案的荒谬之处指出了一个容易被遗忘的事实。
Life and its meaning can't be reduced to a simple statement, or to a list of names, just as human thought and feeling can't be reduced to something articulated by what are ultimately ones and zeros.
生活及其意义不能简化为一个简单的陈述，或一列名字，正如人类的思想和情感不能简化为最终由一和零表达的东西。
If you find yourself asking AI about the meaning of life, it isn't the answer that's wrong.
如果你发现自己在向人工智能询问生命的意义，那么错误的并不是答案。
It's the question.
这就是问题所在。
