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A surge in Chinese corporate bond defaults this year has been concentrated in the state-owned sector, revealing the way in which squeezed local governments are turning a cold shoulder to corporate subsidiaries beset by unsustainable debt burdens.
今年以来激增的中国公司债券违约案主要发生在国有部门，这表明资金紧张的地方政府开始冷眼看待被不可持续的债务负担缠身的下属企业。
A total of 41 default cases have hit China’s domestic debt markets in the year to mid-September, more than the previous two years combined, according to Wind Information, a Shanghai-based financial data company. Some 70 per cent of defaults by end-July were by state-owned enterprises, according to IHS, a consultancy.
总部位于上海的金融数据公司万得资讯(Wind Information)的数据显示，截至9月中旬的一年里，中国国内债市共发生了41起违约事件，高于此前两年之和。咨询公司IHS的数据显示，到7月底大约70%的违约方是国有企业。
Thus a persistent question over the next few years is likely to be: “Who’s next?”
因此，未来几年一个挥之不去的问题很可能是：“下一个是谁？”
Ivan Chung, associate managing director at Moody’s, the credit rating agency, sees a clear pecking order emerging to govern what sort of company is likely to be cut loose by debt-ridden local governments and what sort may be saved.
信用评级机构穆迪(Moody’s)副董事总经理钟汶权(Ivan Chung)看到了一个明确的等级划分：哪类公司可能被债务缠身的地方政府放弃，哪类公司可能被救助？
“If you look forward three to five years, it seems more and more probable that local government entities will need increasingly to stand on their own and the likelihood of substantial government support will gradually recede for those (companies) not providing public goods or a service linked to national priorities as their sole or predominant purpose,” said Mr Chung.
“如果你展望未来三到五年，越来越有可能的情况似乎是，地方政府实体将日益需要自谋生路，对于那些宗旨或主要目的并非提供与国家重点相关的公共产品或服务的公司，政府的实质性支持可能将逐渐减少，”钟汶权说。
Moody’s has compiled key metrics from local governments and the companies they own to suggest which areas of the country are most exposed to financial distress. As overseas investors grow increasingly interested in the mainland’s corporate bond market, such distinctions are of material significance.
穆迪根据来自地方政府及其所拥有公司的数据编制各种关键指标，用以揭示中国哪些地区的财务困境最严重。随着海外投资者对中国内地公司债市场的兴趣越来越浓厚，这种区分具有实质性重大意义。
In the chart below, the enterprises owned by administrations named closer to the bottom right portion of the chart are generally in poorer shape than the ones closer to the top left. So, for instance, state-owned enterprises in Tianjin have liabilities that are 613 per cent of those companies’ revenues, implying a hefty debt burden, according to Moody’s research.
在以下图表中，更接近图中右下角的行政区所拥有的企业，其状况总体上不如更接近左上角的行政区所拥有的企业。所以，举例来说，穆迪研究结果显示，天津国有企业承担的债务达到其企业收入的613%，这意味着它们的债务负担非常繁重。
But Tianjin is better off than the province of Heilongjiang — which has a smaller overall debt load — inasmuch as the state-owned enterprises owned by this northeastern province made losses on assets between 2011 and 2014, impinging upon their ability to service debts from current profits.
但天津的境况强于黑龙江省——该省的总体债务负担更低——但在2011年至2014年，这个东北省份下属国有企业的资产蒙受了损失，削弱了它们以当期利润支付债务利息的能力。
Similarly, Yunnan, Shanxi, Chongqing and Inner Mongolia are administrations which exhibit differing measures of financial frailty either because of high debt loads relative to revenues or poor returns on assets, or a mixture of both. These administrations tend to cover parts of China where overcapacity industries such as steel, coal, aluminium, glass, cement and others are prevalent.
同样，云南、山西、重庆和内蒙古这几个行政区都表现出不同程度的财务脆弱，原因或者是债务与收入之比过高，或者是资产回报率糟糕，抑或两者兼而有之。这些行政区倾向于包括中国境内钢铁、煤炭、铝、玻璃、水泥等产能过剩行业集中的地区。
The big picture behind China’s local government debt problem is stark. The liabilities of well over 100,000 companies owned by local governments across the country grew at an average annual rate of 14.1 per cent from 2012 to 2015 to reach Rmb35.4tn ($5.3tn), according to Moody’s research.
中国地方政府债务问题的总体形势是严峻的。穆迪的研究显示，从2012年到2015年，全国各个地方政府拥有的远超过10万家公司的负债以14.1%的年均幅度增长，增至35.4万亿元人民币（合5.3万亿美元）。
These are treated as contingent liabilities — or potential liabilities — because although local governments do not guarantee the debts of their corporate subsidiaries, they nevertheless are responsible for generating local economic growth, employment and public services so they would be loath to let an important contributor to such goals go under.
这些都被视为或有负债——即潜在的负债——这是因为，虽然地方政府不为下属公司的债务提供担保，但它们要对推动当地经济增长、就业和公共服务负责，所以不愿让这些目标的重要贡献者倒闭。
But in recent years, some local governments have built up such hefty direct debt burdens that even if they would like to bail out an important local employer, they may not be able to. Total direct local government debt, according to Moody’s, was Rmb16tn in 2015. Thus direct and contingent liabilities come to Rmb51tn — more than the GDPs of Japan and Germany combined.
但近些年来，一些地方政府已积累了很沉重的直接债务负担，以至于即便它们愿意救助当地某家重要的企业，也未必办得到。穆迪数据显示，2015年地方政府直接债务总量为16万亿元人民币。因此，直接负债与或有负债之和达51万亿元人民币，超过日本和德国的国内生产总值(GDP)之和。
The chart below shows the relative abilities of local governments to step in to rescue companies that fall into financial distress. Guizhou, for instance, had direct debt of Rmb913bn in 2015, equal to 200 per cent of the province’s revenue. Liaoning, Inner Mongolia and Yunnan were similarly vulnerable, whereas Gansu appears to have ample coverage of revenue relative to debt.
以下图表显示了地方政府介入并救助那些陷入财务困境的公司的相对能力。比如，2015年贵州的直接债务达9130亿元人民币，相当于该省财政收入的200%。辽宁、内蒙古和云南同样脆弱，而甘肃似乎有充足的财政收入去偿还债务。
However, Tianjin — which owns heavily-indebted companies that make averagely poor returns — has a good level of revenue coverage to direct local government debt, meaning the local authorities’ ability to bail companies out is relatively strong.
然而，下属公司负债累累且回报率糟糕的天津，财政收入较高，能够偿付地方政府直接债务，这意味着地方当局救助企业的能力相对较强。
Nicholas Zhu, vice-president at Moody’s, describes a clear hierarchy of debt vulnerability. The most likely to default would be lossmaking, indebted companies owned by lower-tier governments — at the prefectural, city or county level — that have little revenue and large debts. The problem, however, with lower-tier administrations is that they often publish sparse statistics, so it is difficult to know the true state of their financial health.
穆迪副总裁诸蜀宁(Nicholas Zhu)描绘了清晰的债务脆弱性层次结构。最有可能违约的，将是财政收入很低，负债却很高的较低级别（地、市或县）政府所拥有的处于亏损、债务较高的公司。然而，较低级别政府的问题在于，它们发布的统计数据往往很少，所以外界很难知道它们的真实财务状况。
But there are other considerations too. Higher per capita GDPs tends to be correlated with broader economic diversification, insulating an area from the wild swings in fortune created by the commodity cycle. Thus, wealthier parts of China such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai Jiangsu and Zhejiang display greater diversification and have much larger service sectors, meaning these regions are better able to weather downturns in cyclical industries.
但也有其他方面的考量。较高人均GDP往往与更高程度的经济多样化相关，多样化可以让一个地区免受大宗商品周期带来的巨大盛衰波动。因此，北京、天津、上海、江苏和浙江等中国富裕地区表现出更高程度的多元化，有更高比例的服务业，意味着这些地区能够更好地抵御周期性行业的低迷。
Thus, as the chart below shows, Guizhou, Yunnan, Hunan, Shaanxi, Anhui, Qinghai, Guangxi and Ningxia are relatively exposed on this measure.
因此，如以下图表所示，贵州、云南、湖南、陕西、安徽、青海、广西、宁夏在这项指标上相对曝险程度较高。
But even such financial considerations do not tell the whole story of which companies — once under duress — would be allowed to go to the wall.
但是，即便这样的财务考量也没有讲出哪些公司一旦陷入困境将被允许破产的全部故事。
The value to the local government of the work a company does can also be important, suggesting that if a company is involved in building highways, metros, bridges, railways and other essential infrastructure, the local government is less likely to let it default. But if it is involved in a non-essential industry, or more pertinently an industry which the authorities are keen to strip capacity from, it would be much more likely to be cut loose.
一家公司的业务对于地方政府的价值也可能很重要，这似乎表明，如果一家公司建造公路、地铁、桥梁、铁路和其他关键基础设施，那么地方政府允许其违约的可能性更小。但是，如果一家公司不在某个关键行业——或者更确切地说，置身于当局希望去产能的行业——那么它被政府放弃的可能性就大得多。
One important sub-category of state-owned enterprise is local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). These are not only owned, supervised and managed by local governments, they are often also involved in providing public services — making it highly unlikely that a local government would allow them to go bust, Mr Zhu said.
国企的一个重要子类是地方政府融资平台(LGFV)。诸蜀宁说，它们不但为政府所拥有、受到政府的监督和管理，而且经常要提供公共服务，这就大大降低了地方政府允许它们破产的可能性。
