评论
打印
With the US Federal Reserve’s first rate rise approaching, China’s decision to allow the renminbi to depreciate bears similarities to the Swiss National Bank’s pre-emptive reaction to European quantitative easing in January. The lessons from other discarded currency pegs loom large. Asia and Latin America in the 1990s taught us that currency pegs reinforced and indeed exacerbated financial cycles. Asset prices tended to overshoot on the upside, creating macro imbalances that were eventually corrected through catastrophic devaluations.
随着美联储(Fed)首次加息时间临近，中国决定允许人民币贬值，这与今年1月瑞士央行(Swiss National Bank)抢在欧洲启动量化宽松之前采取行动有相似之处。其他国家放弃汇率锚定的先例带给我们的经验教训历历在目。上世纪90年代亚洲和拉丁美洲的经历告诉我们，汇率锚定强化且事实上加剧了金融周期。资产价格往往过度升高，导致宏观经济失衡，最终通过灾难性贬值才得以纠正。
There are both parallels and differences in China’s case. The similarities are that the renminbi experienced a near decade-long appreciation against the dollar and most of its trading partner currencies. The trend was characterised by low volatility and high predictability. Incentives to speculate were large. Foreign capital, often disguised as trade or direct investment flows, circumvented capital controls to enter the real estate market. And after 2008 Chinese groups began to borrow aggressively abroad.
中国的情况与上述例子既有相似之处，又有不同之处。相似之处是近十年来，人民币对美元以及其他大部分贸易伙伴国货币一直在升值，该趋势具有低波动性和高可预测性的特点，极大地刺激了投机。外资往往伪装成贸易流量或直接投资流量，避开资本管制进入房地产市场。2008年后，中国企业又开始在海外大举借贷。
Unless the currency peg is dissolved at a point in the cycle when balance-of-payments flows are reasonably balanced, a de-peg tends to release any volatility that has been stored up, and the currency tends to overshoot in the direction against which the central bank has been leaning. In the Chinese case, as with Asia in the 1990s, the direction has become clearly weaker.
除非是在国际收支流动相对平衡时期的某一时点解除汇率锚定，否则这样做会往往会释放出以往被抑制的所有波动，该货币还往往会朝着与当地央行一直发力的方向相反的方向过度变动。与亚洲上世纪90年代时的情况相似，中国这次的情况是，本币汇率现在明显走弱。
But the differences are important too. Unlike Asia in the 1990s, the renminbi shows few signs of overvaluation in its external balances. The current account surplus, while well down from its peak of 10 per cent of gross domestic product in 2007, is still 3 per cent. And exports have continued to gain market share globally.
但不同之处也很重要。与上世纪90年代的亚洲不同的是，就外部平衡而言，没有多少迹象显示人民币币值被高估。中国的经常项目顺差仍达到国内生产总值(GDP)的3%，虽然这个数字远低于2007年10%的峰值。而且中国的出口在国际市场所占份额仍在增加。
Instead, the currency peg is inconsistent with internal balance, reflecting a growing debt overhang and impending balance-sheet recession. The corporate sector is buckling under a heavy debt burden and worsening producer price deflation. July marked the 40th consecutive month of deflation, as the trend worsened to a year-on-year fall of 5.4 per cent.
中国的汇率锚定反而与内部平衡不一致，这反映了不断增长的未偿债务，以及即将出现的资产负债表衰退。沉重的债务负担，以及日益恶化的工业生产者出厂价格通缩已经要压垮企业部门。随着这一趋势的恶化，7月工业生产者出厂价格指数(PPI)同比降幅达到5.4%，这一指数连续第40个月呈现通缩态势。
Depreciation pressure is about industrial overcapacity born of excess investment. Companies are suffering from weak global trade demand, worsening profitability as labour costs rise, and high debt financing costs.
贬值压力与过度投资导致的工业产能过剩有关。由于全球贸易需求疲软、劳动力成本上升导致盈利能力下降以及债务融资成本高昂，中国企业现在的日子不好过。
Another difference between China and past peggers is that the capital account has been less liberalised. China’s foreign debt liabilities, measured at about $1tn, still pale in comparison with foreign reserves of $3.6tn. But scope for domestic capital flight is huge given the high degree of monetisation in the economy. M2 money supply, a measure of cash and short-term monetary liabilities, is more than 200 per cent of GDP, or nearly $22tn.
中国和过去的汇率锚定国之间另一个不同之处在于，中国资本账户的开放程度更低。中国约1万亿美元的外债余额相对于其3.6万亿美元的外汇储备还是算不了什么。但考虑到中国经济的高度货币化，国内资本外逃的空间很大。衡量现金与短期货币性负债的M2货币供应量达到了国内生产总值(GDP)的两倍多，接近22万亿美元。
Modest domestic capital flight coupled with an unwind in foreign borrowing can make a serious dent in foreign reserves, impart significant depreciation pressure, or both. The strength of its foreign reserve buffer should not be overestimated. Accordingly China finds itself in similar circumstances to past peggers, but with distinct advantages: a large foreign reserve buffer and a less liberalised capital account.
轻度的国内资本外逃加上清偿海外借债，可以严重减少外汇储备，或带来巨大的贬值压力，或两者兼而有之。中国外汇储备的缓冲能力不应被高估。于是，中国发现自己遇到了与之前锚定国相似的处境，却拥有独特的优势：巨大的外汇储备缓冲以及开放程度较低的资本账户。
The decision to allow the renminbi to respond to market pressure for depreciation is belated but positive. China should heed the Swiss lesson to allow the currency to find a new equilibrium, intervening modestly to smooth the fall rather than to prop the currency up at levels inconsistent with domestic fundamentals.
中国允许人民币响应来自市场的贬值压力，这一决定虽然来得迟了些，但具有积极意义。中国应当吸取瑞士的经验，让人民币找到一种新的平衡，适度干预以实现平稳下跌，而非将人民币币值支撑在与国内基本面不相符的水平。
To re-establish a stable equilibrium, the authorities need to resist the temptations of premature capital account liberalisation, write down bad debt and, once and for all, remove implicit guarantees on lending to the state sector that have been a driver of capital misallocation during previous administrations. When central banks unleash volatility, it is rarely positive for risk assets. In this case, the duration of that weakness will largely depend on other reform choices. Without reforms, depreciation pressure will only build. And more pressure will be brought to bear on central banks in Europe, Japan and emerging markets to lean against this with depreciations of their own.
要重建稳定的平衡，中国当局需要抵制过早开放资本账户的诱惑，减记坏账并永久性取消对国有部门贷款的隐性担保，这种担保在前几届政府期间推动了资本的不当配置。当央行释放波动性时，对风险资产极少有积极影响。在这种情况下，汇率走弱的持续时间将在很大程度上取决于其他的改革选择。没有改革，贬值压力只会不断积累。而且，还会给欧洲、日本和新兴市场的央行带来更大压力，迫使它们通过本币贬值来抵挡这种压力。
Gene Frieda is a global strategist for Moore Europe Capital Management
吉恩弗里达(Gene Frieda)是摩尔欧洲资本管理(Moore Europe Capital Management)全球策略师
