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As US President Barack Obama and the leaders of the EU huddle together this week, they will strive to look united and resolved. The reality, as Vladimir Putin knows, is that they are divided and uncertain. The Russian president has moved with a speed and ruthlessness that has left western leaders floundering. Russia swallowed Crimea, in less than a week, with scarcely a shot fired. It has now massed troops on Ukraine’s eastern border – and all that the west has so far offered the Ukrainian military is a supply of US army ready-meals.
在美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)与欧盟(EU)领导人本周会晤之际，他们将力求显得团结而果断。但正如俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)所知道的，现实是他们之间有分歧，而且不确定该怎么做。普京迅速而无情的行动让西方各国领导人显得狼狈。俄罗斯几乎没费一枪一弹，就在不到一周时间里吞并了克里米亚。眼下，俄罗斯在乌克兰东部边境集结重兵，而西方迄今向乌克兰军方提供的只是美军的快餐口粮。
But the notion that Mr Putin has notched up a brilliant victory is misleading. In reality, he has gambled dangerously – and he is likely to lose his bet on the use of force. The annexation of Crimea is risky enough. But an invasion of eastern Ukraine would spell disaster for Russia.
但是，有关普京已经取得辉煌胜利的看法是错误的。现实是，他在进行危险的赌博，而且他付诸武力的豪赌很可能失手。吞并克里米亚的风险已经够大的了，但入侵乌克兰东部将为俄罗斯带来灾难。
Mr Putin’s decision to grab Crimea was a desperate response to a Ukrainian revolution that the Kremlin could neither stop nor control. Rather than go down in history as a weakling who was watching ice dancing in Sochi as Russia “lost” Ukraine, Mr Putin decided to move on Crimea. It worked. Within days, he was enjoying standing ovations in Moscow and soaring opinion poll ratings.
普京决定吞并克里米亚是对乌克兰革命的绝望回应——克里姆林宫既无法阻止也无法控制这场革命。在俄罗斯“失去”乌克兰之际，普京选择出兵克里米亚，而不是作为一名在索契观看冰上舞蹈的弱者被载入史册。这种策略奏效了。在几天时间里，普京在莫斯科享受着议员们的起立鼓掌，同时民调支持率飙升。
But by grabbing Crimea, Russia has ensured that it will eventually lose Ukraine. If Ukraine is allowed to proceed with elections in May, an anti-Moscow majority is all but assured since the Russian speakers of Crimea will no longer be voting, and the remaining electorate is likely to be radicalised by the Russian threat. The interim Ukrainian government has just signed an accord with the EU – the very development that Russia was striving to prevent in the first place. Despite the carefully engineered display of pro-Russian euphoria in Crimea, the territory’s disgruntled minorities – particularly the Tatars – may well resist incorporation into Russia.
但是吞并了克里米亚，俄罗斯最终将失去乌克兰就成了一件板上钉钉的事。如果今年5月乌克兰能够如期举行选举，反对莫斯科的选民肯定会占多数，因为克里米亚讲俄语的选民不再参加选举，剩下的选民很可能在俄罗斯的威胁之下变得激进。乌克兰临时政府刚刚与欧盟签署协定——这正是俄罗斯起初竭力阻止的。尽管俄罗斯在克里米亚精心营造出民众欢欣鼓舞的亲俄场景，但该地区心怀不满的少数民族（尤其是鞑靼人）很可能抵制并入俄罗斯。
A military move into eastern Ukraine would greatly increase the dangers of a political, military and economic blowback sufficiently powerful to threaten the leadership in the Kremlin. Western military analysts have no doubt that, in the first instance, the Russian army would swiftly overwhelm Ukrainian forces. But recent history suggests that, when the world’s leading powers resort to military intervention against a hostile local population, they almost always suffer a long-term strategic defeat. The swift conventional military victory feels great at the time – but is followed by long-term agony.
俄罗斯出兵乌克兰东部将会大幅增加政治、军事和经济上反弹的风险，这种反弹将足以对克里姆林宫的领导层构成威胁。西方军事分析家确信，一开始俄罗斯军队将会迅速击溃乌克兰军队。但近年历史表明，当世界强国武力干涉一个当地人对其怀有敌意的国家时，他们几乎总是会遭遇长期战略失败。迅速取得常规军事胜利当时会带来成就感，但接下来会是长期的痛苦。
Mr Putin, who has lamented that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest “geopolitical disaster of the 20th century”, should know that “disaster” was greatly accelerated by the draining effects of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Even the mighty US – with the largest economy and the most advanced military machine in the world – was unable to win in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
普京哀叹称，苏联解体是“20世纪最大的地缘政治灾难”。他理应明白，阿富汗战争让苏联消耗了国力，大大加快了这场“灾难”的到来。即便是强大的美国——美国是世界上第一大经济体，而且拥有最先进的战争机器——也未能赢得伊拉克或者阿富汗战争。
The cautious, professorial leader in the White House has apparently learnt the lessons of these failed wars far better than his swaggering bare-chested rival in the Kremlin. Of course, the Russian (and American) public get a certain retro thrill from a macho leader who is willing to send in the tanks. But, in time, they end up lamenting his folly.
与克里姆林宫趾高气昂、裸露上身的领导人相比，白宫谨慎而专业的领导人显然更好地从这些输掉的战争中汲取了教训。当然，普京愿意派遣坦克上阵，会让俄罗斯（乃至美国）公众产生某种怀旧的激动，但总有一天，他们将会哀叹他的愚蠢。
Why is it that military force has become so much less effective in achieving political goals? Jeremy Shapiro of the Brookings Institution, who until recently worked for the policy-planning staff at the US state department, suggests that changes in military and social technology have made it much harder for invading armies to secure a lasting victory.
为何军事力量在达到政治目的方面变得如此不济？布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)的杰里米•夏皮罗(Jeremy Shapiro)提出，军事和社交科技的改变加大了入侵军队获得持久胜利的难度。夏皮罗直到不久前还在为美国国务院的政策规划班子工作。
Unless the population of the area that has been invaded is tiny – or almost entirely welcoming – an insurgency is likely to develop. Modern-day insurgents usually have weaponry, such as roadside bombs or rocket-propelled grenades, that can inflict steady casualties on an occupying army.
除非被入侵地区的人口很少（或者几乎全部人口欢迎入侵），否则该地区很可能发生叛乱。当今时代的叛乱分子通常有路边炸弹或者火箭推进榴弹等武器，可以让入侵军队不断遭受伤亡。
They now also have social media and mobile communications technology that make it much easier to get organised. If the insurgency also has powerful external supporters – as in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq – it can be almost impossible to subdue.
他们现在还有社交媒体和移动通信技术，这让他们更容易组织起来。如果他们还获得了强大的外部支持（就像在阿富汗、叙利亚和伊拉克发生的情况），叛乱几乎不可能平息。
The Russians have one “advantage” that they could deploy in trying to suppress an insurgency in Ukraine: the willingness to act with extreme brutality that was displayed during the Chechen wars. But the population of Chechnya is only a little more than 1m and the territory lies within the borders of the Russian state. Deploying “Grozny tactics” after an invasion of a sovereign nation of 45m people, on the borders of the EU, would be an entirely different matter.
俄罗斯有一个镇压乌克兰叛乱的“优势”：就像车臣战争期间展示出的那样，俄方愿意采取极端野蛮的手段。但车臣人口只是略多于100万，而且该地区处于俄罗斯境内。在入侵一个与欧盟接壤、拥有4500万人口的主权国家之后采用“格罗兹尼战术”，将完全是另一回事。
For that reason, Mr Putin may prefer – for now – to use his military to nibble away at smaller targets, such as Moldova. His tactics in Ukraine could initially be restricted to economic pressure, using the leverage of Russian energy, as well as political destabilisation and bribery. Yet trying to turn its large, western neighbour into a basket case is also not a great long-term option for Russia. Even if Mr Putin is not yet set on an invasion of eastern Ukraine, economic and political warfare could unleash a series of events that would eventually lead to armed conflict.
出于上述原因，普京眼下可能倾向于用武力蚕食摩尔多瓦等较小的目标。他在乌克兰的战术最初可能局限于经济压力，利用俄罗斯能源、破坏政治稳定和贿赂等手段。然而让本国西面的庞大邻国陷入一团糟，对俄罗斯并非长期上策。即便普京目前尚未决定入侵乌克兰东部，但双方在经济和政治上的角力可能引发一系列事件，最终导致武装冲突。
If Russian troops do go into Ukraine, you can expect initial triumphalism in Moscow – and hand-wringing in the west. But a “show of strength” in Ukraine would ultimately gravely weaken the Russian state.
如果俄罗斯军队真的进入乌克兰，可以预料的是一开始莫斯科将陶醉在胜利的喜悦中，而西方则会苦恼不已。但在乌克兰“展示实力”最终将严重削弱俄罗斯。
