American fund managers might argue, in their defence, that they are trying to help dirty companies get greener rather than simply dumping their shares as European funds might do, and are being penalised for this.
美国基金管理公司可能会辩称,他们不像欧洲基金可能做的那样简单地抛售股票,而是在试图帮助污染严重的公司变得更环保,并因此受到惩罚。
But the researchers find little evidence of that.
但研究人员几乎没有发现这方面的证据。
Instead they report that American PRI signatories were less likely to engage, as shareholders, with the companies they owned than their European counterparts.
相反,他们报告称,与欧洲同行相比,PRI美国签署方作为股东与他们拥有的公司接触的可能性较小。
Three years after the initial investment, ESG scores at those investee firms were found to be no better.
在接到初始投资的三年后,这些被投资公司的ESG得分也好不到哪里去。
Higher grades may not be the answer anyway.
无论如何,更高的分数可能并不是答案。
ESG ratings are themselves often flaky and may be a poor proxy for emissions.
ESG评分本身往往不可靠,可能无法很好地反映排放。
The transatlantic divide, the paper suggests, may stem from a divergence in regulation.
这篇论文认为,大西洋两岸的分歧可能源于监管方面的分歧。
Europe’s rules are tedious and sometimes misguided.
欧洲的规则单调乏味,有时还会让人误入歧途。
But at least they provide detailed guidance on what counts as sustainable and how green mandates should fit with fund managers’ fiduciary duties.
但至少,它们提供了详细的指导,说明了什么是可持续的,以及绿色授权应该如何与基金管理公司的受托责任相适应。
By contrast American firms seem to be defining their own rules; some simply sign up to the PRI in the sole hope of attracting green-conscious investors, with little to show for their claims.
相比之下,美国公司似乎正在定义自己的规则;一些公司只是简单地签署了PRI,不过是希望吸引有环保意识的投资者,而他们的主张几乎没有什么成果。
Sometimes greenery is even used to keep assets under management growing even as managers post sub-par returns.
有时,绿色环保甚至被用来保持管理下的资产不断增长,即使管理公司的回报低于平均水平。
The authors find that poorly performing American funds are more likely to join the PRI than higher-flying peers.
研究作者发现,表现不佳的美国基金比表现出色的同行更有可能签署PRI。