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He ran media operations inside the royal court, which involved directing the country’s local media,
他负责运作王室内部举办的媒体活动，包括引导该国的地方媒体，
arranging interviews for foreign journalists with the crown prince,
安排王储会见外国记者，
and using his Twitter following of 1.35 million to marshal the kingdom’s online defenders against enemies including Qatar, Iran and Canada, as well as dissident Saudi voices like Mr. Khashoggi’s.
并利用他那135万推特粉丝组织王国的网络防线，对抗卡塔尔，伊朗和加拿大等敌人以及哈苏吉等持不同政见的沙特人。
For a while, he tweeted using the hashtag #The_Black_List, calling on his followers to suggest perceived enemies of the kingdom.
有一段时间，他还用#黑名单这一标签发布推文，呼吁粉丝推荐他们眼中的王国的敌人给他。
"Saudi Arabia and its brothers do what they say. That’s a promise," he tweeted last year.
“沙特阿拉伯和他的兄弟们言出必行。这是我们的承诺，”去年他在推文中写到，
"Add every name you think should be added to #The_Black_List using the hashtag.
“请将你认为应该加入到#黑名单中的每一个名字都用这一话题列出来。
We will filter them and track them starting now."
我们将从现在开始对他们进行过滤和跟踪。”
A Suspected Mole Inside Twitter
有间谍嫌疑的推特内部人员
Twitter executives first became aware of a possible plot to infiltrate user accounts at the end of 2015,
推特高管们最早是在2015年年底意识到沙特可能设计了一个渗透用户账户的阴谋的，
when Western intelligence officials told them
当时，西方情报官员告诉他们
that the Saudis were grooming an employee, Ali Alzabarah, to spy on the accounts of dissidents and others,
沙特正在给他们的一位名叫“阿里·阿尔扎巴拉”的员工洗脑，让他监视异见人士之类的人的账户。
according to five people briefed on the matter.
据五位知情人士透露。
They requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
五位均要求匿名，因为他们无权公开发言。
Mr. Alzabarah had joined Twitter in 2013
阿尔扎巴拉于2013年加入了推特，
and had risen through the ranks to an engineering position
一步一步升到了工程师级别，
that gave him access to the personal information and account activity of Twitter’s users,
自此便有了访问推特用户的个人信息和账户活动信息，
including phone numbers and I. P. addresses, unique identifiers for devices connected to the internet.
包括他们的电话号码，IP地址，多个设备同步所需的唯一标识等，的权限。
The intelligence officials told the Twitter executives that Mr. Alzabarah had grown closer to Saudi intelligence operatives,
情报官员们告诉推特的高管们，阿尔扎巴拉和沙特情报人员走得越来越近了，
who eventually persuaded him to peer into several user accounts,
就是他们最终说服他偷窥多位用户的账户信息的，
according to three of the people briefed on the matter.
据三位知情人士透露。
Caught off guard by the government outreach, the Twitter executives placed Mr. Alzabarah on administrative leave,
此后，被沙特政府的越权行为打了个措手不及的推特给阿尔扎巴拉安排了行政休假，
questioned him and conducted a forensic analysis to determine what information he may have accessed.
对他进行了质询同时还做了取证分析，确定他可能已经访问过的信息。
They could not find evidence that he had handed over Twitter data to the Saudi government,
他们没能找到表明他已经将推特数据交给了沙特政府的证据，
but they nonetheless fired him in December 2015.
但他们还是在2015年12月解雇了他。
Mr. Alzabarah returned to Saudi Arabia shortly after, taking few possessions with him.
之后不久阿尔扎巴拉便返回了沙特，几乎未携带任何财产。
He now works with the Saudi government, a person briefed on the matter said.
现在他已经在为沙特政府效力了，据知情人士透露。
A spokesman for Twitter declined to comment.
某推特发言人拒绝针对此事发表评论。
Mr. Alzabarah did not respond to requests for comment, nor did Saudi officials.
阿尔扎巴拉自己也没有回应对他提出的评论请求，沙特官员也是。
On Dec. 11, 2015, Twitter sent out safety notices to the owners of a few dozen accounts Mr. Alzabarah had accessed.
2015年12月11日，推特向阿尔扎巴拉访问过的几十个账户的所有者发放了安全通知。
Among them were security and privacy researchers, surveillance specialists, policy academics and journalists.
这些人中有安全和隐私研究人员，监控专家，政策学者和记者。
A number of them worked for the Tor project,
其中有一部分人也是Tor项目的工作人员，
an organization that trains activists and reporters on how to protect their privacy.
该项目旨在为活动家和记者提供隐私保护方面的培训。
译文由可可原创，仅供学习交流使用，未经许可请勿转载。
